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THE HAZARDS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH THE
GOVERNMENT: EXPANDING EXCEPTIONS
TO NOERR-PENNINGTON
Local government actions often restrain competition,' frequently
at the behest of private competitors. Traditionally, government has
enjoyed immunity from federal antitrust laws under the Parker2 state
1. See generaly Ettinger, Antitrust Liability of Local Government, 23 MUN. ATr'Y
7, 12 (1982); Slawsky, Can Municipalities AvoidAntitrust Liability, 14 URB. LAW. vii
(1982); Note, The Application o/Antitrust Laws to MunicivalActivities, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 518 (1979). In the regulatory context, see Miller, Antitrust and Certificates of
Need- Health Systems Agencies, the Planning Act, and Regulatory Capture, 68 GEO.
L.J. 873 (1980). In the zoning context, see Payne, Recent Changes in Federal Law-
Antitrust Law and Zoning, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 146 (1981); Note,Antitrust Laws, Zoning
and Agreements to Zone: Delegation of Police Powers after LaFayette v. Louisiana
Power and Light, 25 S. D. L. REV. 314 (1980); Note, Post- LaFayette MunicoalLiabil-
it ofor Refusing to Zone Outlying Development, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 485 (1979).
2. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF ANTITRUST § 238 (1977). The state action exemption is grounded upon fed-
eralism principles, Parker, 317 U.S. at 351; however, the United States Supreme
Court variously interprets the doctrine as a constitutional limitation on congressional
power or as a matter of statutory intent. Compare City of LaFayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 423 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (even Con-
gress cannot subject traditional governmental functions to the antitrust laws) with La-
Fayette, 435 U.S. at 430 n.67 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Parker interprets the antitrust
statutes to exempt state governmental action) and Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 n.15 (1982) (Brennan, J., majority opinion) (scope
of the state action exemption in application to a governmental function is a matter of
congressional intent). See also LaPierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism
Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH.
U LQ. 779, 902 n.473 (1982) (majority of the Court recognizes constitutional limita-
tions upon the power of Congress to bring states carrying out governmental functions
under the antitrust laws).
The Supreme Court recently applied the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1982), to state proprietary activity, specifically the purchase and resale of
pharmaceuticals. Jefferson City Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 103 S.
Ct. 1011 (1983). The Court found that state resale of pharmaceuticals placed the state
in direct competition with retail pharmacies, id. at 1014 n.7, and thus created the
potential for competitive abuse against which the antitrust laws are to provide redress.
The Court, however, strongly implied that the tenth amendment constitutionally ex-
empted states from the antitrust laws when the states purchase goods for state use in
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action exemption.3 Similarly, solicitation of anticompetitive acts of
government has enjoyed protection from antitrust scrutiny under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine.' Recent decisions5 limiting the scope of
the Parker state action exemption6 have caused reexamination of the
related Noerr-Pennington defense. Several recent decisions in the
lower courts indicate increased potential for liability under the anti-
trust laws when private parties solicit anticompetitive acts of
government.
I. NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
A. The Doctrine
Good faith lobbying enjoys antitrust immunity under the first
traditional governmental functions, id. at 1014 n.6 (citing LaFayette, 435 U.S. at 413
n.42).
3. See generally P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, I ANTITRUST LAW § 207 (1978 &
Supp. 1982); Areeda,Antitrust Immunity/or "StateAction"After LaFayette, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 435 (1981); Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1978); Pos-
ner, The Proper Relationsho Between State Regulation and Federal Antitrust Laws, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (1974).
4. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is derived from United States Supreme Court
decisions in Eastern Railroads Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
The former decision immunized the lobbying efforts of an association of railroads
from antitrust attack. The latter decision exempted union and coal owner's attempts
to influence decisions of the Secretary of Labor and the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Noerr-Pennington protection extends to adjudicative forums. California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). See generally Oppenheim,
Antitrust Immunityfor Joint Efforts to Influence Adjudication Before AdministratiAe
Agencies and Courts-From Noerr-Pennington to Trucking Unlimited, 29 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 209 (1972).
5. The state action exemption requires a clearly articulated, actively supervised
state policy of restraint of trade. See Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Alumi-
num, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); City of LaFayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389 (1978).
6. Private instigation of anticompetitive governmental action that fails to meet the
state action exemption may also lose Noerr-Pennington protection. See infra note 24
and accompanying text. See SUSMAN & WHITE, THE PERSPECTIVE OF A PLAINTIFF'S
LAWYER, in ANTITRUST AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 21, 27 (J. Siena ed. 1982); Bern,
The Noerr-Pennington Immunityfor Petitioning in the Light of City of LaFayette's
Restriction on the State Action Immunity, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 279, 285. The growing
inadequacy of the Noerr-Pennington defense is becoming a matter of some concern in
the business community. An Old Antitrust Defense Falters, Bus. WEEK, April 11,
1983, at 66.
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amendment rights of petition7 and free speech.8 To guarantee the
right of the public, through government officials and agencies at all
levels of government, to the free flow of information, the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine exempts private communications with the govern-
ment from antitrust liability.9 The doctrine, both constitutionally
and statutorily based,' ° protects communications with government
regardless of anticompetitive intent." The Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine extends beyond lobbying to include communications with ad-
ministrative and adjudicative agencies of government. 12
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I states: "Congress shall make no laws. . .abridging...
the right of the people. . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances."
8. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of corporations to engage in protected
speech in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) and First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
9 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137. The statutory argument was premised, in turn, upon
the federalism principles of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Id. See also La-
Fayette, 435 U.S. at 399-400. Justice Stewart made explicit the logical linkage be-
tween the Parker state action exemption and Noerr protection of free speech and right
of petition in California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 516
n.3 (1972) (concurring opinion).
10. See Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action:
The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 80 (1977)
(author believes Noerr-Pennington should be limited to constitutionally required pro-
tection of speech and petition). But see Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston,
519 F. Supp. 991, 1024 (S.D. Tex. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir.
1983) (Noerr and Parker jointly construe the antitrust laws to avoid interference with
governmental decision-making that results in a valid restraint of trade).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently examined the basis of the No-
err-Pennington doctrine and decided that solicitation and petition are statutorily ex-
empted from the antitrust laws, not merely constitutionally protected. Coastal States
Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, reh'gen banc denied, 699 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1983)
(immunity extends to actions brought in foreign courts because Noerr-Pennington is a
statutory exemption).
I1. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139.
12. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972). Justice Douglas rested his opinion squarely upon first amendment grounds,
id, but also took the opportunity to articulate the "sham litigation" exception, id at
511. See infra note 17 and accompanying text. Although Justice Stewart, concurring,
characterized this aspect of the majority opinion as a retreat from the first amendment
protection provided under Noerr, id at 516, Noerr itself anticipated the sham litiga-
tion exception when the Court distinguished protected lobbying from attempts to in-
terfere directly in the business relations of a competitor. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
Compare Vendo Co. v. Lekto-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 635 n.6 & 644 (1977) (plural-
ity and dissent) (single lawsuit may constitute an antitrust violation) with Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, on remand, 360 F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn.
1973), aft'dmem., 417 U.S. 801 (1974) (Noerr-Pennington does not protect repetitious
lawsuits brought by monopolist as part of a scheme to delay competition) and Grip-
19841
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B. The Sham Litigation Exception
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Eastern Railroads Pres-
Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982) (malicious
prosecution in the antitrust sense occurs when the defendant brings suit not to vindi-
cate rights but to harass a competitor).
The Noerr-Pennington immunity loses force in the adjudicative context. Behavior
considered relatively insignificant in the legislative arena is taken far more seriously
in the adjudicative context. Compare Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Dispo-
sal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969) (legislator's personal reasons for lawful action
irrelevant to antitrust laws) with Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc.,
414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (Noerr-Pennington does not protect litigation
brought with improper purpose and coincident with other acts probative of abuse of
process), af'd, 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981). See
also Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, 516 F.2d 220,228 (7th Cir. 1975) (uneth-
ical conduct that would prevent Noerr-Pennington immunity in adjudicative setting is
of little relevance in legislative context). The distinction derives from Californ a Mo-
tor Transport, 404 U.S. at 513, but logically follows from the nature of the injury
inflicted. See infra note 17.
The characterization of an act of government as adjudicative (or "quasi-judicial")
or legislative thus assumes some importance. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v.
San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1079 &
1087 n. I (9th Cir. 1976) (majority and dissenting opinions). The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit decided that the defendant city council in Metro Cable, 516 F.2d
220 (1975), acted in a legislative capacity when the council awarded a cable franchise.
Council members enjoyed Noerr-Pennington immunity from allegations of bribery
and conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit decided that the franchise award was a legisla-
tive act because Illinois statutes granted to the "corporate authorities" of the munici-
pality the power to franchise. Id. at 228 n.12. In addition, the court examined the
procedure followed by the council, noting that the city council retained no evidentiary
record and could receive information through exparte contacts. Id at 228. Presuma-
bly, these criteria are part of the federal common law.
In some instances there may exist state law controlling the characterization of gov-
ernmental acts as legislative or adjudicative. The federal courts appear to consider
state law. In the zoning context, see, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc.,
426 U.S. 668 (1976) (due process challenge of referendum by which small parcel of
land was rezoned; rezoning characterized as a legislative act, following state law). But
see, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 n.15
(1982) (state law investing Home Rule municipality with full powers of state is not
relevant to availability of state action exemption). See also Fasano v. Board of
County Comm'rs of Wash. County, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973) (proceedings
before city council to consider rezoning in accordance with standards provided by a
comprehensive plan are quasi-judicial). Cf. also Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake,
1981-I Trade Cas. 1 64,029 (D. Colo. 1980) (rezoning decision is quasi-judicial ac-
cording to state law and individual municipal defendants usually enjoy immunity in
antitrust action. The district court, however, in finding liability, held the municipal
defendants acted outside the scope of the authority extended by the legislature.). The
question remains whether ex parte contacts, for example, may occur in a rezoning
without endangering the Noerr-Pennington defense in a subsequent antitrust action.
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idents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. , qualified the anti-
trust immunity conferred upon lobbying, excepting those activities
ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action but that
amounted to a mere sham concealing an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relations of a competitor.14 In California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,t5 the United States Supreme
Court expanded the sham litigation exception delineated in Noerr to
include unethical conduct that denies a competitor "free and unlim-
ited access"' 6 to administrative and judicial proceedings. 7
13. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
14. Id at 144.
15, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
16. Id at 511.
17. In California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), truckers alleged that
trucking competitors instituted state and federal proceedings in order to interfere with
plaintiffs petitions for operating licenses. The Court extended the "sham litigation"
exception, first alluded to in Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144, to include misconduct that perpe-
trates a fraud on the court, bribery, or conspiracy with government officials. Id at
513. The Court reasoned that such misconduct is "access barring" because the behav-
ior effectively usurps the decision-making process. Id at 513. See supra note 12.
There are two general rationales for the sham litigation exception, at least in the
adjudicative setting. First, baseless and repetitive lawsuits resemble an antitrust tort
of malicious prosecution. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466
(7th Cir. 1982). Compare Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977) (con-
curring opinion) (single lawsuit may qualify under the sham litigation exception) with
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 86 (1973) (sham litigation exception
carries hallmark of repetitive lawsuits of insubstantial claims). See generally Balmer,
Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 39 (1980); Note, The
Limitations of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine as a Defensefor PoliticalActivity in Re-
straint of Trade, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 773, 788-91 (1981).
Second, corruption or abuse of the adjudicative process is "access denying" because
the abuse renders the forum incapable of making a fair and reasoned determination
of individual rights. See Litton Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 809-
12 (2d Cir. 1983); Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagar Real Estate, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1124
(N.D.N.Y. 1977), aft'd, 578 F.2d 1372 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978).
See Crawford, Jr. & Tschoepe II, The Erosion of Noerr-Pennington Immunity, 13 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 291, 320 (1981). See generally Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunityfor
Concerted Attempts to Influence Courts and Adudicatory Agencies: Analogies to Mali-
cious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86 HARV. L. REv. 715 (1973).
In theory, both "sham lobbying" and sham litigation may exist. In practice, acts
probative of corruption or abuse of the adjudicative forum carry little weight where
legislation is involved. The antitrust plaintiff cannot readily show causation or lack of
"policy bias" by probing the mind of a legislator. See generally 1 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 203.3 (Supp. 1982). See, e.g., Metro Cable Co. v. CATV
of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975). But see Westborough Mall v. City of
Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982) (legitimate lobbying activities accompa-
1984]
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Courts struggle to give meaning to the sham litigation exception.'
8
Abuse of the right of petition bars access when meaningful adjudica-
tory or administrative proceedings are denied.19 Repetitive baseless
suits abuse the right of petition.2" Use of baseless litigation to delay
or otherwise disadvantage a competitor constitutes an antitrust viola-
tion where the competitive injury flows directly from the act of peti-
tioning and not incidentally from an act of government.2 Finally,
corruption of the adjudicative process denies access to a fair and im-
partial forum22 and is subject to antitrust scrutiny.23
nied by illegal or fraudulent activities created an anticompetitive preference for de-
fendant's development project).
18. See, e.g., Ross v. Bremer, 1982-2 Trade Cases (CCH) $ 64,746, 71,618 (W.D.
Wash. 1982) ("no satisfactory definition of the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington
immunity exists").
19. Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (action
by drug manufacturers alleging that competitors conspired to preclude manufacturers
from the market by influencing FDA to deny fair consideration of new applications).
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
20. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 840-41 (9th Cir. 1980) (devel-
oper selected by urban renewal agency to develop regional shopping center brought
action against unsuccessful developer for filing thirteen baseless lawsuits). See supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
21. Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1981) (real estate
developers brought antitrust action against shopping center owners and managers,
alleging defendants conspired to prevent developers from opening a competing shop-
ping mall by organizing protracted opposition before state administrative agencies
and by bad-faith litigation); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local
Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 940 (1977). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Franchise Realty
required the plaintiff to allege not only that the defendant undertook "access barring"
litigation, but also that the defendant communicated threats of litigation in order to
directly accomplish his anticompetitive purpose. Franchise Realty, 542 F.2d at 1081.
See Note, Franchise Realty v. Culinary Workers: "Chilling" the Sham Exception, 72
Nw. U.L. REv. 407, 410 (1978). As a matter of logic, compare the analysis applied by
the Second Circuit when a municipality brought frivolous litigation for the expressed
purpose of delay and obstruction, Miracle Mile Assoc. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d
18, 21 (2d Cir. 1980) (public purpose in bringing admittedly frivolous litigation pre-
cludes antitrust scrutiny). Whether the rationale of Miracle Mile escapes LaFayette,
infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text, when municipalities protect proprietary en-
terprises is problematic.
22. See, e.g., Ross v. Bremer, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,746 (W.D. Wash.
1982) (solicitation and financing of litigation by other parties); Brown v. Carr, 1980-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,033 (D.D.C. 1979) (agent's breach of duty); Mason City
Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979) (anticompe-
titive agreement with city council to delegate right to veto competitor's application for
rezoning to private party); Nelson v. Utah County, 1978-1 Trade Cas. 62,128 (D.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol26/iss1/10
PRIVATE ANTITRUST LIABILITY
C. The Commercial Function Exception
Several courts construe Noerr-Pennington as a corollary of the
Parker state action exemption. 4 If an anticompetitive act of govern-
ment is not exempt from the antitrust laws as a state-mandated policy
of restraint,2" then private solicitation of anticompetitive governmen-
tal restraints of trade may lack antitrust immunity under Noerr-Pen-
nington. One major category of unprotected state action exists where
government acts as a commercial competitor of private enterprise.26
Utah 1977) (conspiracy with governmental officials to adopt unlawful zoning
ordinance).
23. Judge Higgenbotham has noted that once the courts accept an allegation of
'sham litigation," antitrust courts can hardly avoid relitigating decided cases,
notwithstanding resyudicata principles. Higgenbotham, The Noerr-Pennington Prob-
lem., A iewfrom the Bench, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 730, 736 (1978). See, e.g., Ross v.
Bremer, 1982-2 Trade Cas. 64,746, at 71,619 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
One solution to this problem is to devalue "baselessness" as a factor in deciding
whether an antitrust claim can arise from bringing a lawsuit. Arguably, this is the
antitrust court's answer to the defendant's responsive pleading of meritorious litiga-
tion. See Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1981).
24. See, e.g., Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist. of Peoria, 557 F.2d 580,
593 (7th Cir. 1977) (antitrust action against city park district resulting from termina-
tion of concessions); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975);
Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F Supp. 1301, 1313-14 (E.D. Mich.
1979), vacated 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981) (non-profit organization action against
city and state officials alleging that defendants conspired to exclude organization from
market of providing hospital facilities and services in violation of antitrust laws); Nel-
son v. Utah County, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 62,128 (D. Utah 1977) (property
owners brought antitrust action against county alleging defendants conspired to re-
strain trade in the use and sale of real estate).
25. See supra note 5.
26. Whether the commercial function exception survives Community Communi-
cations Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), is not clear. For a general discus-
sion of Boulder, see 12 SETON HALL L. REv. 835 (1982) and 35 VAND. L. REv. 1041
(1982). In Boulder, the Court reversed the court of appeals holding that restraints of
trade resulting from governmental functions automatically come under the state ac-
tion exemption, while those arising from proprietary functions are exempt only under
the more stringent tests of LaFayette and Midcal. At the very least, Boulder must be
read to apply the state action tests to all restraints of trade by political subdivisions,
irrespective of the kind of governmental activity involved. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at
55 n. 18. The distinction, however, between proprietary and governmental functions
remains in state action exemption analysis. In Jefferson County Pharmaceutical As-
soc., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983), retail pharmacies brought
action against certain drug manufacturers and state university hospitals for violations
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (inducing or receiving a price discrim-
ination). In a decision largely concerned with statutory interpretation of certain sav-
ing provisions in the Act, the Court also noted that state competition in the retail
markets cannot share in the constitutionally-based protection of the state action ex-
1984]
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In City ofLaFayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. ,27 the Supreme
Court considered the antitrust consequences of sham litigation alleg-
edly brought by a municipal competitor of a private utility in con-
spiracy with certain private parties. In response to the city's claimed
Parker state action exemption defense, a majority of the Court held
that the city could not claim state action immunity when the munici-
pality acted as a competitor with private enterprise.28 Justice Bren-
nan, writing for a plurality, concluded that municipalities could not
claim immunity absent a showing that the municipality carried out a
state-mandated policy of restraint of trade.29 Chief Justice Burger,
concurring,30 focused upon the nature of the activity in which the
municipality engaged. In order to qualify for Parker state action ex-
emption, proprietary 3 municipal activity in restraint of trade must
be state-mandated.
As a result of the Supreme Court's holding in LaFayette, proprie-
tary activity of the government may not enjoy the state action exemp-
emption otherwise accorded to governmental functions. Abbott Laboratories, 103 S.
Ct. 1011, 1014 n.6 and 1016-17 n.17.
27. City of LaFayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
28. Id at 403.
29. Id. at 406-07.
30. Id at 418.
31. Chief Justice Burger defined governmental activity, in federalist terms, as
traditional and integral functions of state government. Id at 422 and note 3. The
majority opinion first addressed the question whether the state authorized the local
governmental purpose and then inquired whether the legislature intended local gov-
ernment to act anticompetitively to accomplish that purpose. Id at 412.
The lower courts have created a "commercial activity" exception to Noerr-Pen.
nington immunity. Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist. of Peoria, 557 F.2d
580, 592-93 n.10 (7th Cir. 1977) (see supra note 24); Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971) (bottler and seller of soft drinks brought action
against Teamsters' Union alleging coercive measures by defendants upon state fair
officials resulting in officials issuing directives forbidding the sale of Coca-Cola;
Ninth Circuit held unions not exempted from antitrust liability); George R. Whitten,
Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 31-34 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 850 (1970), on remand, 376 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1974), affTd, 508 F.2d 547
(1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975) (where public bodies in connection
with purchase of pipeless swimming pools acted under laws requiring competitive
bidding, adoption by public bodies of defendant-contractors' specifications does not
fall within antitrust exemption for valid governmental action); City of Atlanta v. Ash-
land-Warren, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. 64,527, at 72,926 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (Noerr-
Pennington exception does not apply when government acts as consumer in the mar-
ketplace unless city officials act in commercial rather than policy-making context).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol26/iss1/10
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tion. Private parties, therefore, may find communications which
solicit such restraints of trade subject to antitrust scrutiny.32
D. Governmental Co-conspirators
Justice White's opinion in United Mine Workers v. Pennington
33
left open the possibility that conspiracy between public officials and
private parties may deprive the private co-conspirator of Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity.34 Similarly, in California Motor Transport,35 Jus-
tice Douglas specifically referred to conspiracy with a licensing
authority as an example of "illegal or reprehensible" conduct, result-
ing in a loss of antitrust immunity.36 Because governmental co-con-
spiracy results in both improper adjudication and illegal or ultra vires
acts of government, the conspiracy falls under an exception to Noerr-
Pennington37 and moots the policy rationale underlying the Parker
state action exemption.38
II. NOERR-PENNINGTON AND THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
The widening sham litigation exception to Noerr-Pennington is
premised upon "access barring" activity of private petitioners and lit-
igants that inhibits fair and impartial decision-making. 39 This ration-
32. The significance of the proprietary-governmental function distinction must be
evaluated in light of Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S.
40. See supra note 26.
Whether Noerr-Pennington fails to protect speech soliciting nonexempt state action
is discussed in Bern, The Noerr-Pennington Immunity for Petitioning in Light of La-
Fayette's Restriction on the State Action Immunity, 1980 ARIz. ST. L.J. 279, 289. See
infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
33. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
34. Id at 671.
35. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
36. Id at 513.
37. See, e.g., Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975). See also
Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1016-26 (S.D. Tex.
1981), rev'don other grounds, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 54-63 and
accompanying text.
38. Not surprisingly, allegations of governmental co-conspiracy frequently appear
in otherwise routine state-law franchise, zoning, and regulatory cases. Plaintiffs as-
serting antitrust claims premised upon boilerplate allegations of governmental co-
conspiracy rarely succeed on the merits. I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 203.3a (Supp. 1982).
39. Barring access means more than the instigation of baseless repetitive litigation
and may include private unethical acts such as solicitation and maintenance of suits
by others. See supra notes 12 and 17. In Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664
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ale applies equally well to bring solicitation of non-exempt
anticompetitive governmental action within the reach of the antitrust
laws.
In circumstances where the Parker state action exemption does not
apply,4° the antitrust plaintiff may contend that the private defendant
instigated unprotected anticompetitive conduct by the government or
that the government acted as an antitrust co-conspirator." Similarly,
ultra vires anticompetitive acts of government may generate an anti-
trust claim against the private party soliciting anticompetitive action.
Moreover, anticompetitive decisions rendered without sufficient due
process safeguards42 may preclude Noerr-Pennington immunity.
Several recent decisions shed light on the relationship between No-
err-Pennington and the federalism principles underlying the Parker
state action exemption. In Ross v. Bremer,43 plaintiffs seeking to de-
velop a downtown shopping center brought action against defend-
ants, owners of a downtown department store and prospective
developers of a competing mall.44 The plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendants conspired to block the proposed development of the com-
peting mall in order to preserve and expand their existing
monopoly.45 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, engaging in
a concerted scheme of sham zoning litigation, solicited and financed
F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit held that litigation coupled with the solici-
tation and financing of suits by other parties was not entitled to first amendment
protection, even though the defendants had been granted certiorari to the state
supreme court at that court's "sound judicial discretion" in light of "special and im-
portant reasons" for review. Id at 894-95 n.6. Because the defendant solicited and
financed litigation by others for the purpose of gaining standing and because of de-
fendant's alleged scheme of delay, the Second Circuit decided that the plaintiff stated
a cause of action under the sham litigation exception. Id at 896. See also Litton Sys.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 809-12 (2d Cir. 1983); Ross v. Bremer,
1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,746 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (defendant's solicitation and
financing of suits constitutes sham litigation, even though the actions made new law
in state court). See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 2 and 3 1.
41. See, e.g., Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981); Stauffer v. Town of
Grand Lake, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029 (D. Colo. 1980); Nelson v. Utah
County, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,128 (D. Utah 1977).
42. Westborough Mall v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2122 (1983). See supra note 12 and infra notes 70-76 and
accompanying text.
43. 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,746 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
44. Id at 71,617.
45. Id
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lawsuits to gain standing.46 Contending that the defendants misused
the adjudicatory process, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants'
conduct constituted sham litigation rather than conduct protected
under Noerr-Pennington. 7 The defendants, however, asserted that
because they prevailed before the Supreme Court of Washington, the
actions failed to fall within the scope of the sham litigation exception
to Noerr-Pennington.48
The United States District Court of Washington, relying princi-
pally upon the plaintiffs' allegations of solicitation and maintenance,
held that the defendants' lawsuits might constitute sham litigation,
violative of the antitrust laws.49 Although the defendants' litigation
resulted in the formulation of new state law,50 the Ross court con-
cluded that the success of litigation does not determine the litigation's
antitrust immunity under Noerr-Pennington .5  Because the antitrust
injury stemmed from delay in the adjudicatory process, the defend-
ants, in effect, litigated at their own peril. Apparently, litigation need
be neither repetitious52 nor meritless as a matter of state law to estab-
lish a sham, at least when combined with professional misconduct
indicative of an intent to perpetuate fraud upon the court.
In Airport Car RentalAntitrust Litigation, a United States District
Court in California, in finding that regulation of ancillary airport
services constitutes a proprietary activity, held that concerted efforts
46. Id at 71,618.
47. Plaintiff presented evidence of defendant's intent to delay construction and
prolong litigation. Id at 71,617.
48. Id at 71,618. But see Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891 (2d
Cir. 1981); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1980).
49. Ross, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,746 at 71,618, 71,619.
50. The actions, brought by an adjacent landowner, resulted in new law on the
"collateral issues" of zoning due process, record and notice of hearing requirements,
and environmental protection, requiring full disclosure of the impact of the proposed
development upon the "socioeconomic environment." Id at 71,617.
51. Id at 71,619. In finding defendants' successful litigation not determinative on
the question of antitrust liability, the district court stated:
Nor is this a proper case for resjudicata or collateral estoppel. It appears that the
Washington State Supreme Court cases were not a final judgment on the issues
of zoning. The causes of action in the state litigation are not identical to those in
the instant case, which is based on allegations of antitrust violations. Those two
factors preclude a finding of resyudicata.
Id
52. See supra note 12.
53. 474 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
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by automobile rental agencies to influence airport authorities to limit
eligibility to engage in the on-airport automobile rental market were
not protected under Noerr-Pennington .1 On consolidation and reas-
signment," the district court rejected the notion that lobbying before
governmental agencies not exempt from the antitrust laws precludes
protection under Noerr-Penninglon .6
Finding first amendment protection of commercial speech, the dis-
trict court rejected the prior holding that activities intended to influ-
ence government engaged in a commercial capacity are
distinguishable from activities directed towards government engaged
in a governmental capacity.57 Noting the United States Supreme
Court's growing concern over commercial speech,"8 the court avoided
the imputation of municipal liability for anticompetitive acts to solic-
iting private parties. 9 In determining whether the application of fed-
eral antitrust laws to activities intended to influence government
officials or agencies engaged in a proprietary function constitutes
constitutionally permissible regulation, the district court concluded
that to condition protection of speech and petition upon apost hoc
determination that the governmental agency acted within the scope
of the Parker state action exemption would be inherently unfair. 60
54. Id at 1091-96. The court clearly thought that Noerr-Pennington immunity
stands or fails with the Parker state action exemption:
This is not at all a novel idea. . . . One of the bases of the Supreme Court's
decision in Noerr was its earlier holding in Parker that "where a restraint upon
trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to
private action, no violation of the Act can be made out.". . . The Court is there-
fore not breaking new ground in suggesting that the reach of Noerr-Pennington
may be limited to cases in which the government's conduct would be immunized.
Id at 1089 n.15, quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136 (emphasis added).
55. In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 521 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
afid, 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982).
56. Id at 584.
57. Id at 577.
58. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The Supreme
Court issued the CentralHudson opinion one year after the federal district court opin-
ion in In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 474 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
On consolidation, the district court viewed the balancing approach of the earlier opin-
ion, 474 F. Supp. at 1085-87, as constitutionally unsound. Car RentalAntitrust Litiga-
tion, 521 F. Supp. at 582.
59. Car Rental 4ntitrust Litigation, 521 F. Supp. at 582-83. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, in pertinent part, the district court's decision. 693 F.2d 84
(9th Cir. 1982).
60. Car RentalAntitrust Litigation, 521 F. Supp. at 584.
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Finally, the district court, in finding antitrust regulation incompatible
with first amendment guarantees, further concluded that the mere po-
tential for antitrust liability would have a chilling effect upon com-
mercial speech.61
Based upon the alleged facts, the federal court dismissed the plain-
tiffs' claim of conspiracy among the automobile rental agencies and
the airport authorities to exclude new automobile rental agencies
from the on-airport market. Pushing Parker out the front door, the
district court promptly swept Parker in through the back door. Con-
ceding that sufficient allegations of governmental co-conspiracy
might be made, the district court suggested that a finding of unlawful
anticompetitive action desired on the part of the private defendants,
coupled with a finding that the action undertaken failed to fall within
the scope of the agency's authority, would preclude the private de-
fendants from Noerr-Pennington protection.62
Other courts have reached similar results. In Affiliated Capital
Corp. v. City of Houston,63 the plaintiff applied for a municipal cable
television franchise but refused to participate in a market-allocation
agreement allegedly sponsored by the city in conspiracy with compet-
ing franchise applicants. Although deciding the case on alternative
grounds," the district court carefully analyzed the relationship be-
tween the state action exemption and the governmental co-conspira-
tor exception to Noerr-Pennington .6 1 In finding that certain
governmental officials were not only co-conspirators but actively
"orchestrated" and "manipulated" aspects of the conspiracy, the dis-
trict court removed the private parties from Noerr-Pennington
protection.66
61. Id.
62. The district court noted that the plaintiff had alleged a governmental co-con-
spiracy, but had not shown defendant's direct participation in any anticompetitive
combination. Id at 590. The district court further noted, however, that whether the
private co-conspirator should lose Noerr-Penningon immunity may depend upon
whether the private co-conspirator intended to produce only valid governmental re-
stramts on trade. Id at 590 n.30. This proposed test accomplishes little by way of
distinguishing the interdependent defenses under Parker and Noerr-Pennington. No-
err-Penington brings even communications made with anticompetitive intent under
constitutional protection. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
63. 519 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 700 F.2d 226 (5th
Cir. 1983).
64. Id at 1012.
65. Id
66. Id at 1021-22.
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Rather than basing the holding upon the "access barring" effects of
the conspiracy on the adjudicative process, the district court based
the holding upon corruption in the legislative process.67 Inasmuch as
the illegal activities of the individual governmental co-conspirators
were imputed to the governmental entity itself, the district court in-
validated the franchise agreement.68 Moreover, protection under No-
err-Pennington proved unavailable to the private defendants who had
sought the illegal activity. 69
Governmental co-conspiracy may extend to violations of proce-
dural due process in a regulatory context. In Westborough Mall v.
City of Cape Girardeau,7° developers of a shopping mall brought an
antitrust action against the municipality and a competing developer.
The Westborough developers alleged that the city illegally acted to
deprive the plaintiffs of their zoning rights without due process.71
Specifically, the developers claimed that the city manager and a com-
peting developer illegally conspired to prevent competition by im-
properly reverting72 the zoning classification obtained to develop
Westborough Mall. The reversion, in effect, discouraged financial
supporters and prospective tenants, and eventually destroyed the
shopping mall project.73
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing summary judg-
67. Id at 1020 n.26. Analogizing corrupt zoning decisions to franchising, the dis-
trict court relied upon Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp.
737 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
68. Affiliated Capital Corp., 519 F. Supp. at 1025. The district court noted that
Parker had left undecided what result should follow proof of governmental co-con-
spiracy. Id at 1026 (citing Parker, 317 U.S. at 351).
The court explained this result by asserting that Noerr-Pennington is grounded
upon the need for free citizen participation in government. An absolute first amend-
ment immunity for anticompetitive conspiracies with government would not improve
democratic decision-making, but would obstruct it. Id at 1026. As the district court
suggested earlier in its opinion, there remains little to distinguish this rationale from
that of the sham litigation exception. Id at 1013 n.22.
69. Id at 1025.
70. 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'g and rem'g, 532 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Mo.
1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2122 (1983).
71. The original rezoning ordinance had expressly exempted plaintiff from an or-
dinance that purported to automatically revert undeveloped land to its prior use
within three years of rezoning. Westborough Mall, 693 F.2d at 737.
72. Id at 736.
73. Plaintiff alleged, in effect, that the city desired certain businesses associated
with his competitor to locate in Cape Girardeau. Id at 744 n.6.
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ment in favor of the municipality and competing developer,74 held
that the preferential relationship between the private defendants and
the municipality constituted sufficient circumstantial evidence to sup-
port an inference of a conspiracy to deprive Westborough developers
of their zoning rights.7" The Eighth Circuit, however, declined to
rely upon the governmental co-conspiracy exception to bring the pri-
vate defendant under the antitrust laws. In finding the defendant
precluded from Noerr-Pennington protection, the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that the illegal zoning reversion, coupled with the municipal-
ity's delay in correcting the improper zoning classification, may have
reflected the intended result of the defendant's lobbying activity. 7
6
Finally, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the conspiracy to "thwart
normal zoning procedures" and to deprive Westborough developers
of their property interests failed to advance any clearly articulated
state policy.7 7 The conspiracy, therefore, failed to fall within the
Parker state action exemption.
III. CONCLUSION
Growing uncertainty concerning the advantages of the Noerr-Pen-
nington defense will have a chilling impact upon basic constitutional
rights of speech and petition. Courts should be reluctant to deprive
private parties of Noerr-Pennington protection. Under the sham liti-
gation exception, there exists a growing danger that antitrust courts
will retry allegedly baseless litigation or develop federalized stan-
dards of professional ethics.7 8 Although some doubt exists concern-
ing the applicability of the commercial state action exception to
74 532 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
75 Plaintiff presented evidence of delay in correcting the erroneous reversion of
his property, evidence of the private defendant's intent to cause such delay, and evi-
dence of the private defendant's efforts to cause the city to undertake an illegal rezon-
rng. 693 F.2d at 744 and n.6.
76. Id at 746.
77. Id See supra note 12. Ironically, the Eighth Circuit found the individual
governmental co-conspirators exempted from antitrust liability, id at 748 n.9, follow-
ing the rule of absolute immunity for legislative officials announced in Gorman Tow-
ers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (civil rights action brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
78. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text. Unexpected hazards may
await counsel in any potentially anticompetitive litigation, including personal anti-
trust liability as a defendant and loss of privilege otherwise protecting communica-
tions with his client. Higgenbotham, supra note 23, at 736.
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Parker,79 counsel should be cognizant of the potential liabilities
posed by solicitation of anticompetitive state action in connection
with proprietary functions of government. Moreover, non-commer-
cial anticompetitive government action that is declared nonexempt
state action may result in the withdrawal of Noerr-Pennington immu-
nity from private party defendants.8 0 Finally, private liability for
tainted or procedurally-defective regulatory action may survive a No-
err-Pennington defense so long as the governmental actor appears to
have responded to private solicitation.8 This result will persuade
cautious private parties to abjure their rights of petition and inhibit
proper functioning of local government. Until the Supreme Court
addresses the question of governmental antitrust liability for illegal
government activities, it is anomalous to burden the private exercise
of speech and petition when government wrongfully accedes to an-
ticompetitive proposals.
Scott A. Garretson
79. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
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